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INTRODUCTION 
The jury has come to the forefront of public debate in New Zealand , highlighted recently 
by a number of hung juries in prominent criminal trials. Hung juries have aroused public 
interest in the jury, and in particular jury-room deliberations, as the public seeks to 
understand how and why a jury could not determine the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, particularly when later juries do return a verdict. 
In late November 1995, John Robert Barlow was convicted for the double murder of 
Gene and Eugene Thomas after two days of deliberation by the jury. There had been 
two previous hung juries, and the estimated cost of the three trials was for over $400,000 
in legal aid and well over one million dollars in police and Crown costs.1 
On 13 October 1995, after deliberating for more than 18 hours, the jury in the trial of 
molecular biologist Vicki Calder, accused of attempting to murder her former lover, 
Professor David Lloyd, declared it was unable to reach a verdict. The case, known as 
the "Poisoned professor" case, was the second highly publicised trial in the last year 
where a jury had returned no verdict. Subsequently, Calder was found not guilty by the 
second jury. 
The notorious Peter Plumley Walker trials traversed the range of jury verdicts with three 
very different results . The first trial in November 1989 resulted in a guilty verdict for both 
accused after thirteen hours of deliberation. This was overturned by the Court of Appeal 
six months later due to inadequate direction to the jury by the High Court Judge sitting on 
the case.2 A retrial was ordered and commenced in February 1991 but ended in a hung 
jury, despite further instructions from the judge, after twenty-seven hours of deliberation. 
The third and final trial started in May 1991, and resulted in acquittal for both accused. 
This paper seeks to address the perceived problem of the hung jury in criminal trials , 
questioning whether the policy of secrecy surrounding jury deliberations is worthwhile. 
consider the role of the jury in our justice system , and look at research in regard to what 
it actually achieves. I discuss some possibilities for reform of the jury to eliminate some 
of the factors which may contribute to hung juries. 
' Kate Coughlan "Death on the Terrace: how Barlow's trials unfolded" The Evening Post, Wellington , New 
Zealand, 25 November 1995, 14. 
2 R v Chigne/1 (1991] 2 NZLR 257. 
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II THE JURY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
A The Origins of the Jury 
Trial by Jury is a product of the Norman Conquesr of England. The modern day jury is 
far removed from the original jury which consisted of a body of men from a particular 
locality sworn to give a true answer (veredictum, verdict) to any question of interest to the 
Crown. In the criminal law, the jury was there to supply information to the court, reporting 
any criminal acts by members of the community. The subsequent determination of guilt 
or innocence occurred through trial by ordeal. 
Over the centuries the role of the juror has evolved from that of witness to that of 
adjudicator. Any person who has personal knowledge of the matter under trial is now 
required to be sworn as a witness and give evidence to the jury. 
B The Modern Jury 
Juries are now purely arbiters of fact on evidence presented to them. In summing up to 
the contemporary jury before they begin their deliberations, the judge indicates the 
differing functions of the judge and the jury in a trial. A sample summation from the 
District Court of Wellington suggests a statement from the judge to the jury along these 
lines:4 
It is my duty to regulate the conduct of the trial, to rule on questions of evidence 
and procedure, and to direct you upon the law applicable to the case. I direct you 
to accept what I tell you about the law. 
On the other hand, the sole responsibility for deciding all questions of fact is 
yours. It is for you to decide what evidence you will accept or reject or what 
weight you will give to any part of the evidence. If I appear to indicate any view of 
the evidence or of any witness which does not accord with yours, you disregard 
what I have said. Findings of fact and decisions on the credit of witnesses are for 
you, not for me. 
3 Hon J Bruce Robertson (consulting ed .) Adams on Criminal Law (loose-leaf) (Brooker & Friend, Wellington, 
1992) Ch 5.1.01 ; Hon Mr Justice McHugh "Juror's Deliberations, Jury Secrecy, Public Policy and the Law of 
Contempt" in Duff P. and Findlay M. The Jury Under Attack (Butterworths Ply. Ltd. , Sydney, 1988) 56-7. 
• Department of Courts Sample Summation (criminal trial) (District Court, Wellington, New Zealand, 1996) 
sample summation - criminal (model 1 ), 116. 
• I 
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Juries are often considered better arbiters of fact than judges because of the diversity of 
experience reflected in twelve different views, the collectivity of the decision-making, and 
the freshness of approach which jurors have, rather than the potential narrowing of vision 
that may occur with judges and which could affect-their decision-making.
5 As one 
commentator explains, "historically, the criminal law has accepted that the common 
sense and popular knowledge of a group of ordinary citizens is more likely to reach an 
understanding of the truth than might some collection of specialised, professional 
minds."6 
C Jury Verdicts 
The present law in New Zealand is that in all criminal cases the verdict must be 
unanimous. This rule, like the secrecy of jury deliberations, derives from the common 
law. While a jury should always be directed as to the need for unanimity, the absence of 
such a direction is not held to vitiate the trial.
7 The unanimous verdict in a criminal trial 
requires like-mindedness on the part of each of the twelve jurors,
8 but does not extend to 
the reasons on which each individual juror relies.
9 
There are three different categories of verdicts in a criminal case that exist for the jury to 
return. Delivering a judgment for the Privy Council, Lord Devlin discussed these:
10 
The first is the general verdict which is of conviction or acquittal upon the whole count. 
The second is the partial verdict. When at common law or by statute a jury is 
empowered to convict of a lesser or different crime to that charged in the count, they can 
be asked to return partial verdicts specifying the crime to which each verdict refers. The 
third category ... is the special verdict, where the jury ... 'state the naked facts, as they 
find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the Court thereon '. 
The jury's assigned role is as arbiter of facts, yet an interesting contradiction which 
follows from this is that the jury can give general verdicts on the guilt or innocence of the 
5 Law Reform Commission: Victoria Role of the Jury in Criminal Trials (Australian Government Printing 
Service, Canberra, Australia, 1989) 42 . 
• M. Findlay, "The Role of the Jury in a Fair Trial" in The Jury Under Attack, above n 3, 163. 
7 R v Potter (1962] Crim LR 55. 
8 R v Patterson (1980) 2 NZLR 97 (CA). 
9 Thomas v R (1972) NZLR 34, 41 (CA) . 
'
0 R v Nasral/a (1967) 2 AC 238, 248-249 (PC). 
accused, without stating which facts they find proven or not proven to enable their 
verdict. The availability of different types of verdicts seems to negate the role of the jury 
because the special verdict, which seems to complement the fact-finding endeavour 
most suitably, is a very rare occurrence in any criminal matter. 11 
D The Role of the Jury in Our Justice System 
Some writers claim that trial by jury was enshrined as a constitutional right in the Magna 
Carta, 1215, clause 39, which provided for a "trial by peers". 12 Other commentators hold 
that the Magna Carta has nothing to do with trial by jury, and that the translation of the 
Latin "judicium parium" in clause 39 implied the right to judgment for the accused by a 
judge of equal rank, rather than a trial by one's peers. 13 
Whatever the foundations of "the right to trial by jury", the significance that the jury now 
holds in our society is exceptional. Commentators have considered the jury to be the 
"palladium" of justice and the "sacred bulwark of the nation"
14
, "the lamp that shows that 
freedom lives"15, and the "touchstone of common-sense"16• 
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Trial by jury has been considered by some commentators as an injection of democracy 
into the legal system. Lord Devlin considers that "Each jury is a little parliament."
11 It is a 
symbol of participatory democracy, a mechanism for lay participation in the justice 
system which gives people confidence in its fairness , 18 and educates them in the ways of 
the law. 19 The jury is upheld as a protector of liberty and a safeguard of democracy, 
because of its capability to override oppressive laws and protect against political 
interference in administration of justice. The jury is said to guard against judicial 
corruption, socially prejudiced judges and police corruption and overeagerness.
20 
11 Above n 3, Adams Ch 5.15.03. 
12 Sir Patrick Devlin Trial By Jury (Hamlyn Lectures, Methuen & Co., London , 1956) 164; Nicholas Blake "The 
Case for the Jury" in The Jury Under Attack, above n 3, 140; New Zealand Law Commission Juries: Issues 
Paper (Wellington 1995) 6-7. 
13 W.R. Cornish The Jury (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London , 1968) 12; Forsyth , History of Trial by Jury 
(1852) 108. 
14 Blackstone, W., Commentaries, Vol. IV, 1776, 349. 
15 Above n 12, Devlin , 164. 
16 Campbell , E. "The Secret Chamber of the Law" (1 962) 36 ALJ 119, 121 . 
11 Above n 12, Devlin , 164. 
1
• Above n 13, Cornish , 255. 
•• Above n 16. 
20 Above n 13, Cornish , 137. 
The legitimacy of the independence of the jury which has been central to its ideological 
attractiveness for centuries is said to be ensured by its representativeness of the views 
of the community. The proposition is that the jury represents the conscience of the 
community and will perform its functions in line with social morality. The jury is able to 
dispense fairness and temper law with mercy to enable "justice" through the general 
verdict, which "preserves the basic legal dogma in appearance and at the same time 
circumvents it in fact, to the end of permitting that pliancy and elasticity which is 
impossible according to the dogma, but which life demands."2 1 
Lord Devlin, writing extra-judicially in 1981, says:22 
The jury is the means by which the people play a direct part in the application of 
the law .... The interrelation between judge and jury, ... , secures that the law will 
not be applied in a way that affronts the conscience of the common man [sic]. 
Constitutionally it is an invaluable achievement that popular consent should be at 
the root not only of the making but also the application of the law. It is one of the 
causes of our political stability. 
5 
Countering these fervent philosophical views are more practical arguments against the 
jury. These propose that the jury lacks intelligence and understanding of the issues, that 
juries may be susceptible to argument and easily swayed and that juries are unfamiliar 
with legal and fact-finding issues in a trial. 23 It is also argued that complex cases may 
prove difficult for a jury to comprehend24 and that the intricacy of jury trial procedure leads 
to expense and inconvenience for all involved, and is very time-consuming.
25 
The lack of any reasons given by the jury for their decisions leads to uncertainty and 
unpredictability because of the general verdict. Judges must give reasons for their 
decisions, yet juries do not have this requirement, and there is no formal responsibility or 
accountability of jurors for their decisions. 26 
Some of the arguments against the jury raise very serious and relevant criticisms. 
However, because juries deliberate in secret, legal debates about jury functioning and 
21 Jerome Frank Law and the Modern Mind (Anchor Books, New York, 1963) 184. 
22 The Judge (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 1981) 127. 
23 Glanville Williams The Proof of Guilt (Hamlyn Lectures, 3 ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1963) 271. 
2
' R v Van Bee/en (1972) 6 SASR 534, as cited in Law Reform, above n 5, 65. 
25 Law Reform, above n 5, 42-43, 
6 
arguments for and against the jury have relied heavily on anecdote and have been 
founded mainly upon speculation of what goes on inside a jury room during deliberations. 
Ill JURY SECRECY AND THE COMMON LAW 
The traditional and firmly established rule is that a court will not receive evidence of what 
occurred during a jury's deliberations. This rule is not founded upon any statute but has 
arisen from the common law. 27 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in 1979 in R v Papadopoulos stated:20 
For centuries the Courts have declined to receive affidavits from jurors purporting 
to disclose what took place during their deliberations in the jury room or the jury 
box. The rule dates from at least the time of Mansfield CJ , who would not look at 
an affidavit of two jurors swearing that the jury were divided and reached a verdict 
by tossing up: Vaise v Delaval (1785) 1 TR 11 ; 99 ER 944. 
More recently the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Solicitor-Genera/ v Radio New 
Zealand Ltd has indicated that not only is evidence from jurors unacceptable but has 
emphasised the confidential nature of jury deliberations; upholding that "conduct which 
may undermine the jury system, or public confidence in it, is capable of constituting 
contempt [of court],".29 
There are some exceptions to this rule ; as an appeal court may receive evidence that a 
juror was not qualified to serve as a juror.30 A court may also receive evidence about 
"matters extrinsic to the deliberations", for example, where jurors have undertaken their 
own investigations outside the courtroom , or where there is evidence that a juror was 
biased. 31 Recently the New Zealand Court of Appeal suggested that in an extreme case 
the court may receive evidence of what occurred during deliberations, for example where 
one juror threatens the others with a gun. In the same case, the Court held that 
26 Above n 3, McHugh, 65-66, above n 5, 42-43. 
21 R v Papadopoulos [1979) 1 NZLR 621 ; R v Coombs [1985) 1 NZLR 318; R v Norton-Bennett [1990) 1 
NZLR 559; R v Tawhiti [1994] 2 NZLR 696; Ellis v Oeheer [1922] 2 KB 113; 38 TLR 605; Boston v W S 
Bagshaw & Sons [1967) 1 WLR 1126. 
2
' [1979) 1 NZLR 621 ,626 per Cooke J. 
2
• Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994) 1 NZLR 48, 55. 
30 Ras Behari Lal v King-Emperor ( 1933) 50 TLR 1. 
31 R v Tinker [1985) 1 NZLR 330 (CA) ; R v Riley [1982) 1 NZLR 1 (CA); R v Bates [1985) 1 NZLR 326 (CA) ; 
R v Harbour (1995) 1 NZLR 440; R v Coombs (1985) 1 NZLR 318; R v Norton-Bennett (1990) 1 NZLR 559; 
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members of the jury should not be approached by counsel without leave of the Court or 
agreement of the prosecution. 32 
A Why Has This Rule Developed Through The Common Law? 
The rule upholding secrecy of jury deliberations is considered essential in the public 
interest and is based on strong public policy grounds.33 Lord Denning MR accounted that 
"the reasons are twofold: first, to secure the finality of decisions arrived at by the jury; 
secondly, to protect the jury themselves and to prevent them from being exposed to 
pressure or inducement to explain or alter their views."34 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal considers that the protection of the jury system 
requires finality of jury verdicts, candour and full participation of jurors in jury 
deliberations, and privacy for the jurors.35 R v Papadopoulos examines the reasons for 
the common law position on jury secrecy in New Zealand:36 
One reason is the need for finality in decisions; the uncertainty that would prevail 
if it were always open to a juror to say afterwards that he or she had not really 
agreed is obvious. It is also vital that jury discussions should be free and frank; 
no juror should be deterred from expressing his or her independent opinion by the 
fear of victimisation or undesired publicity if that opinion could later be disclosed. 
Public confidence in the jury system could be shaken and jurors could be 
distracted from doing their duty conscientiously if individual members of the jury 
were free to publicise their own versions of debates in the jury room. Jurors 
should not be exposed to importuning on behalf of the accused or by litigants or 
to any temptation to capitalise on disclosures. 
The Honourable Mr Justice McHugh discusses in depth the policy behind jury secrecy, 
summing up that "the policy of the law is to prevent the deliberations of jurors being used 
for the purpose of attacking the verdict."37 
32 R v Taka (1992) 2 NZLR 129,131 . 
33 Above n 27, R v Papadopoulos. 
34 Boston v W S Bagshaw & Sons [1967] 1 WLR 1126, 1135n, per Lord Denning MR. 
35 Above n 29, Solicitor-Generalv Radio New Zealand Ltd. 
36 Above n 27, R v Papadopoulos. 
37 Above n 3, McHugh, 61 . 
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The English courts in Attorney-General v New Statesman and Nation Publishing Co. Ltd. 
held that in order to establish that publication after a trial of a juror's disclosure of jury-
room secrets was a contempt of court it was necessary to show that the disclosure 
tended or would tend to imperil the finality of jury verdicts, or to affect adversely the 
attitude of future jurors and the quality of their deliberations. 38 
There have been several judicial statements to the effect that jury-room discussions are 
to remain secret. At the end of the first "Poisoned Professor'' trial, which concluded in a 
hung jury, Justice Tipping warned the jurors that any attempts to interview them should 
be resisted and told the media that anyone who sought comment from the jurors on the 
case or on their deliberations would be held in contempt of court. 39 His Honour's reasons 
for this were indicated in his address to the media where he stated that the case was still 
alive and that nothing should be said, either orally or in writing by the media, that could 
prejudice a retrial. 40 
McHugh canvassed arguments in favour of the jury secrecy rule and arguments in favour 
of disclosure of jury verdicts , yet he concluded that what is required is greater knowledge 
of the workings of the jury room:41 
What is needed is scientific, thorough research into the system carried out by 
those competent to do it. Only knowledge of that kind will let us know whether 
the system needs improvement or abandonment. At the moment trial by jury is 
being increasingly condemned without the jurors being heard. The critics tell us 
that juries are of no use in cases concern ing scientific or accounting or any 
complex form of evidence. Verdicts by judges, we are told, are better because 
they are reasoned and more predictable .. .. 
It may be that the abandonment of secrecy, far from destroying the system, may 
be all that will save it. The jury system will only survive in the end if the 
community accepts that it is in the public interest that it should survive. 
36 [1981)QB1. 
39 "Hung jury in Lloyd poison case" The Christchurch Press, 14 October 1995, 1. 
•
0 Above n 39 . 
., Above n 3, McHugh, 70-71 . 
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IV HUNG JURIES 
Hung juries are the result of a jury not being able to reach a unanimous decision in 
delivering a verdict of either guilty or not guilty. In most jurisdictions, juries hang in less 
than four per cent of cases approximately.42 Hung juries have been discussed as being 
undesirable in terms of cost, delay and the effect on the accused in particular.43 
Section 37 4 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that a jury may be discharged once it has 
been deliberating for more than four hours and has not reached a verdict. No definite 
time limit should be imposed on a jury's deliberations, although a judge may inquire 
whether there is any likelihood of the jury reaching a verdict or whether he or she can be 
of any assistance to them. This is allowed provided it is made clear to the jury that they 
are not under any pressure.44 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Accused indicated that a direction along the 
following lines would be appropriate in New Zealand when a jury reported difficulty in 
agreeing and sought guidance from the judge:45 
Members of the Jury: 
I have been told that you have not been able to reach a verdict so far. That 
sometimes happens, and it is no reflection on any of you. I have the power after 
you have been in retirement for 4 hours to discharge you from giving a verdict, 
but not unless and until I am satisfied that it should be done. Judges always 
hesitate to discharge a jury, because it usually means that the case has to be 
tried again before another jury and experience has shown that juries are often 
able to agree in the end if given more time. 
Each of you has sworn or affirmed that you will try the case to the best of your 
ability and give your verdict according to the evidence. It is important that you do 
your best to accept that responsibility and not pass it over to another jury. You 
are here as representatives of the community with the responsibility on behalf of 
the community of trying to reach a collective decision of all of you. 
42 This is accepted as the standard proportion in various jurisdictions in Australia, England and the United 
States: W. J. Brookbanks "Hung Juries or Majority Verdicts: the Jury on Trial" (1991] NZLJ 188, 189; Kalven 
and Zeisel , The American Jury (Little & Brown, Boston , 1966); New Zealand Royal Commission on the 
Courts (1978) . 
" NZ Law Commission , above n 12, 12; John Pike "Majority Verdicts: The Barlow Trial in Retrospect" New 
Zealand Bar Association Papers Presented at the Auckland Conference (Auckland , 9 March 1996) 53-55. 
44 R v George (1984] 1 NZLR 272, 278 (CA). 
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One of the strengths of the jury system is that each member takes into the jury 
room his or her individual experience and wisdom and is expected to judge the 
evidence fairly and impartially in that light. You are expected to pool your views 
of the evidence and you have a duty to listen carefully to one another. 
Remember that a view honestly held can tJe equally honestly changed. So, within 
the oath, there is scope for discussion, argument, and give and take. That is 
often the way in which in the end unanimous agreement is reached. 
But of course no one should be false to his or her oath. No one should give in 
merely for the sake of agreement or to avoid inconvenience. If in the end you 
honestly cannot agree, after trying to look at the case calmly and objectively and 
weighing carefully the opinions of others, you must say so. If regrettably that is 
the final position, you will be discharged and in all probability there will have to be 
a new trial before another jury. 
Therefore I am asking you, as is usual in such a case, to be good enough to retire 
again and see whether you can reach a unanimous verdict in light of what I have 
said. 
This recommended direction by the Court of Appeal indicates several good reasons why 
the jury has endured as an institution within the justice system. 
Hastie, Penrod and Pennington's study46 has drawn the conclusion that the hung jury is 
actually important to the legal system: 47 
Hung juries have a conceptual and symbolic significance that is far greater than 
their frequency of occurrence would indicate. This is because they signal a 
failure of the jury institution to produce its desired result of a clear and 
unequivocal decision. However, the label of "failure" is misleading, for the hung 
jury is "a valued source of integrity" and has been interpreted as a sign that anti-
defendant bias was not present. 
The jury has provoked much comment recently, especially as a direct result of the 
introduction of new legislation which allows television filming inside the courtroom. The 
Calder trial was one of the cases involved in the media pilot, and Justice Tipping, the 
45 [1988] 2 NZLR 46. 
46 Hastie, Penrod and Pennington Inside the Jury (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1983). 
47 Hastie, above n 46 , 165-166 in reference to Kalven and Zeisel , above n 42 , 453. 
presiding judge, questioned whether the increase in hung juries recently related to the 
detailed media coverage that the two Barlow trials and the "Poisoned professor'' cases 
received. 48 
A Possible Reasons Why Juries Cannot Recfch Unanimous Verdicts 
l l 
The first major study of juries, conducted by Kalven and Zeise!, suggested that the most 
likely reason for a hung jury was a response to genuine difficulties in the case, and that 
this may be a reflection on the clarity with which the issues of fact and law are submitted 
to the jury.49 
Because jury deliberations are secret and juries do not have to give reasons for their 
verdict, there is no adequate empirical basis from which to determine why juries are 
hung. This factor raises questions as to whether they hang because of {1) judicial 
misdirection, or (2) ambiguous communications between judge and jury or between 
counsel and jury, or (3) simply because there is genuine disagreement amongst the 
jurors. 
The Crown carries the burden of proving their case to the jury against the accused 
"beyond reasonable doubt". This phrase is fraught with difficulties. The courts have 
consistently declined to assign any percentage, or any percentage range to the level of 
proof required. 50 In comparison, the civil law burden of proof, which is "the balance of 
probabilities", requires proof to 51 per cent. Courts sometimes allow the synonym "sure" 
or allow the explanation that a "reasonable doubt" is "a doubt which you decide is 
reasonable in all the circumstances. 51 
Detailed jury studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s seem to indicate that jurors have 
real difficulty in understanding what the standard of proof actually means. 52 It has been 
articulated that jurors have differing interpretations as to what is "reasonable", with one 
case comment expressing that "the existence of dissent does not necessarily 
demonstrate that either the majority was wrong or that the dissenters were acting 
•• Justice Tipping "Television in Court", Bar Association , above n 43, 85. 
•• Kalven and Zeisel , above n 42 , 201 as cited in Jan Gaunter "Hung Juries in Light of the Plumley Walker 
Trials" {1992) 7 AULR 54, 79. 
50 Hon. Justice McGechan & Arthur Tompkins "Evidentiary Issues" (New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
Butterworths, July-August 1996) 3. 
51 R v Kaki Unreported, 29 March 1993, Court of Appeal , CA394/92; R v Speakman (1989) 5 CRNZ 250, 
260; R v Brown (1990) 5 CRNZ 606 , 609; R v Routh (1992] 1 NZLR 290. 
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unreasonably: both may agree that the defendant is probably guilty, and differ only as to 
whether a doubt that they share is "reasonable"."53 
The Hastie study analysed the complete pattern of communication in mock juries, and 
found that little or no time was spent discussing the standard of proof during 
deliberations. It was suggested by the researchers that this may mean jurors fail to 
understand when to apply the standard of proof .54 The authors stated:55 
When a probabilistic issue, such as the possible identification of the perpetrator of 
a crime as the defendant, is the focus of the trial, then discussion of the standard 
of proof is prominent in deliberation. However, when the standard of proof is 
applied to intuitively less probabilistic elements of the crimes charged , such as the 
defendant's state of mind, then the jury fails to heed the trial judge's instruction 
that each element of a crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to 
return a guilty verdict. 
In Barber and Gordon's account of juror experiences56 , difficulties with jurors often 
applying the burden of proof to the civil standard of "the balance of probabilities" rather 
than the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" were evident. Many of the 
jurors felt their job was simply to ask whether or not the defendant committed the crime, 
and thus convicted on the balance of probabilities. A law lecturer's published account of 
her experiences as a juror in the United Kingdom included juror comments such as "I'm 
saying guilty but I don't believe those police".57 
The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is crucial to maintain the element of 
fairness in criminal trials. It is a safeguard, along with the unanimous verdict, which 
exists to ensure that the verdict is reached with the highest possible level of certainty. 
These difficulties appear to have some influence over the verdicts of juries but it is 
difficult to know because of the secrecy surrounding the deliberations. 
52 Van Dyke Jury Selection Procedures (Ballinger, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977) 204. 
53 Case Comment, "Unanimous Criminal Verdicts and Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" (1964) 112 U Pa L 
Rev 769, 772 , as discussed in Gaunter, above n 49 , 59. 
5
' Hastie, above n 46, 97. 
55 Hastie above n 46 , 87, Gaunter, above n 49, 60. 
56 Barber & Gordon (eds.), Members of the Jury (Wildwood House, London, 1976) as discussed in Gaunter, 
above n 49, 60. 
57 Darbyshire, "Notes of a Lawyer Juror" (1990) 140 New LJ 1264, 1266 as discussed in Gaunter, above n 
49, 60. 
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V RESEARCH ON JURY DECISION-MAKING 
Robert J. MacCoun50 discusses jury decision-making, stipulating that there are two 
different phases; cognitive processing during the trial, and deliberation in the jury room.59 
He states that "because jury deliberation is cloaked in secrecy, legal policymakers have 
made important decisions about the scope and conduct of jury trials on the basis of 
untested intuitions about how juries reach their verdicts."60 
In .the 1950s, researchers at the University of Chicago covertly recorded the deliberations 
of several federal juries for the purposes of research . Despite the court's co-operation 
this endeavour was aborted by a congressional inquiry, resulting in legislation prohibiting 
attempts to observe or record jury deliberation. 61 Since then, researchers have resorted 
to other strategies to study jury behaviour particularly archival analyses, post-trial 
interviews and mock jury experiments. 
A Kalven and Zeisel's Jury Study 
One of the largest and most influential studies of juries ever conducted was by Kalven 
and Zeisel in the 1960s. The study examined the verdicts of 3576 trials in the United 
States, comparing systematically the judge's view of the evidence and of what they 
thought the verdict should have been to what the jury actually decided. In 64.2 per cent 
of the cases, juries voted to convict, with judges in agreement in 96 per cent of those 
cases. Agreement on acquittals was very different, with judges voting to convict 604 of 
the 1083 persons (57 per cent) that juries would have acquitted. This is less surprising in 
light of the fact that judges would have returned a guilty verdict on 83.3 per cent of all 
defendants. 
In effect, Kalven and Zeisel 's work suggests that if the judges' views are to be the 
criterion against which the validity of jury decision-making is evaluated, then juries are 
very poor performers, and vice versa.62 
58 A social psychologist in the Behavioural Science Department at The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 
CA. 
59 Robert J. MacCoun "Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making" (1990) 30 Jurimetrics Journal 223, 
223. 
60 MacCoun, above n 59. 
61 Enid Campbell "Jury Secrecy and Contempt of Court" (1985) 11 (4) Monash Uni LR 169. 
62 Kalven and Zeisel , above n 42 , as discussed by Geoffrey M. Stephenson The Psychology of Criminal 
Justice (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford , 1992) 180-181 . 
b 
No-one knows for sure why the juries disagreed with the judges so markedly, but the 
judges themselves attributed their disagreement with the juries they instructed to the 
following factors: 63 
Sentiments on the law (equity) 
Sentiments on the defendant 
Issues of evidence 
Facts only the judge knew 
Disparity of counsel's abilities 
per cent 
29 
11 
54 
2 
4 
100 
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Stephenson comments on these statistics, acknowledging that they represent only the 
judges' informed guesswork; "If we applaud juries for disputing the law's appropriateness 
(29 per cent), and forgive them for not knowing facts only known to the judge (2 per cent) 
or being swayed unusually by one counsel's superior abilities (4 per cent), that leaves 54 
per cent of cases of disagreement between judge and jury, in which juries misinterpreted 
the evidence, and 11 per cent in which jurors let their private feelings about the 
defendant influence their decision."64 
B Baldwin and McConville's Research 
Baldwin and Mcconville carried ·out a study of jury performance of nearly 1 OOO cases in 
Birmingham and London Crown Courts, looking at the extent to which juries' verdicts 
accord with the views of judges, police, and experienced trial lawyers. They found that 
perverse convictions and acquittals were a feature of jury decision-making. Serious 
doubts by at least two parties from the judge, police, prosecuting barrister and defending 
barrister, occurred in 36 per cent of all acquittals and 1 O per cent of all convictions by the 
jury. ss 
There are serious flaws with a comparison of jury verdicts to the judiciary's or any legal 
experts' opinions of how a case should be determined. Baldwin and McConville 
63 Kalven and Zeisel , above n 42, 115; Stephenson, above n 62, 181 . 
64 Stephenson, above n 62, 181 . 
65 John Baldwin & Michael Mcconville Jury Trials (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 37. 
15 
acknowledge that high levels of agreement between juries and judges tell us little about 
how well or how badly the jury is functioning . They felt that the comparison did provide a 
useful yardstick by which a jury's performance can be measured, holding that "it is 
certainly arguable that, where the judge and jury agree, a defensible verdict is likely to 
have been reached."66 
C The McCabe and Purves Study 
This was an experiment in the UK which used shadow juries composed of prospective 
jurors selected from the electoral register in the same fashion as regular jurors. These 
shadow juries were established for each of thirty Oxford Crown Court trials. They were 
put into the public galleries of the court to listen, and when the real jury went out to 
deliberate, these juries were withdrawn from the court and undertook their own 
discussion of the case before bringing in a verdict. Their discussions were recorded and 
transcribed. 
It was found that when a shadow jury took a vote at the start of deliberations, the vote 
rarely changed by more than two moves in either direction . Those votes which were 
initially 9:3 became 10:2, and most which started at 11 :1 became unanimous. This may 
simply have been because only a majority of 9:1 or 10:2 or 10:1 is required in the UK in 
criminal cases, 67 but it was evident from the content analysis of the taped discussions 
that jurors' opinions which were formed during the trial tended to crystallise quite early in 
the deliberations. 
The study also showed that the jurors took their task extremely seriously and were not 
prepared to let "hunches" lead to conviction , but instead looked determinedly for 
evidence upon which the conviction could be based. 
Perhaps the most significant result of the study was the subjects' emphasis on the 
importance of the judges' directions to the juries. The shadow jurors made it clear that 
they considered the judge to be more influential than anyone else in helping the jurors 
come to an understanding of the facts and the relevant law in the case. Their 
deliberations often referred to these directions and they frequently recalled the instruction 
66 Above n 65, 37. 
that their verdict was only to be based on the evidence presented in court, especially 
when the deliberations went astray. 
The study concluded that further jury research needed to focus on a comparison 
between a transcript of the judge's summation and the jury deliberations following it. 
16 
The standard of proof proved to be a problem for the jurors, especially where the 
evidence was circumstantial or inferential. This difficulty was most apparent when a case 
turned on the finer points of mens rea (criminal intent).68 
If the jury is a reliable instrument for measuring guilt, then there should be substantial 
agreement between the "real" and "shadow" juries. Stephenson comments that while 
there is a statistically significant association between the verdicts of the two sets of juries, 
there are clear discrepancies. Three (23 per cent) of the 13 defendants that real juries 
found guilty would have been acquitted by the shadow jury, and six (38 per cent) of the 
16 found guilty by shadow juries were acquitted by the real juries. 69 
D The Hastie Study0 
Subjects were recruited from the Superior Court jury pools in three counties of 
Massachusetts and were shown a re-enactment of a murder trial. The subjects were 
then assigned to one of three groups: 
(i) unanimous verdict, (12:0) 
(ii) majority verdict, (10:2) 
(iii) majority verdict, (8:4). 
The research focused on the effects of varying the type of jury verdict required and the 
types of behaviour displayed during deliberation. A pattern emerged as to the way in 
which jurors attacked their deliberations. They tended to begin with a discussion of the 
agenda for deliberation or voting, where the groups fell into either an evidence-driven 
deliberation, or a verdict-driven deliberation. The former method reviewed the evidence 
67 Section 17 of the Juries Act 1971 (UK) .. Majority verdicts only allowed after two hours deliberation and the 
foreman must state in open court that the jury is deadlocked and the number of jurors who respectively 
agreed to or dissented from the verdict. 
68 Latin translates roughly to English as "guilty mind". 
69 Stephenson above n 63, 183-4. 
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quite broadly and assessed it, looking for a general account of the events, with voting 
ballots taking place quite late in the deliberations. The latter method began with a ballot 
so that numbers for guilty, not guilty and undecided could be ascertained immediately, 
with the pattern of polling continuing to be quite frequent throughout the deliberations. 
Measurements were taken on the formal voting rates in each of the groups. On average, 
the unanimity groups took a head count every 23.4 minutes, the 10:2 majority every 15.4 
minutes and the 8:4 majority every 19.7 minutes. The inference drawn from these 
differences was that a unanimity requirement induced "an integrative, evidence-driven 
deliberation style" while the majority verdicts favoured the verdict-driven style. 
Another significant finding of the Hastie study was the in-depth analysis of the 
deliberations in the period following a majority of eight being reached in the unanimity 
and 10:2 groups. It was discovered that crucial events happened at this point in the 
deliberations. For example in twenty-seven per cent of the cases there were requests for 
more direction from the judge, and in thirty-seven per cent of the cases discussion 
centred on the standard of proof at this time. 
Contrary to popular belief, a majority of eight did not necessarily mean the final verdict 
had been determined. The authors concluded that "In unanimous decision rule juries a 
number of important events, including reversals of the most popular verdict choice , 
substantial portions of the discussion, and requests for further instructions, occurred 
during the period after the largest faction exceeded eight members. This and other 
findings in the analysis of deliberation content strongly imply that the unanimous decision 
rule should be preferred over majority decision rules." 
E The Wrightsman Study1 
This research involved the use of controlled mock juries in which groups of six 
deliberated on the facts of a case involving first degree murder. The study focused on 
the deliberation process in regard to unanimous and two-third majority verdicts and were 
videotaped without the subjects' knowledge. 
10 Hastie, above n 46 , 98 as discussed in Gaunter, above n 49, 67. 
71 Wrightsman , Kassin and Willis In the Jury Box: Controversies in the Courtroom (1987) 251 , as cited in 
Gaunter, above n 49, 68. 
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It was found that the jurors tended not to deliberate to unanimity unless they were forced 
to do so. The researchers' impressions were that majority juries will never reach 
consensus, that they are less effective in convincing all members that the verdict is the 
appropriate one, and that the deliberations were shorter and less robust that those than 
those where a unanimous verdict was required. -
The findings of the Wrightsman study were held to lend great weight to the comments of 
US Justice William Douglas who stated "It is said that there is no evidence that majority 
jurors will refuse to listen to dissenters whose votes are unneeded for conviction . Yet 
human experience teaches that polite and academic conversation is no substitute for the 
earnest and robust argument necessary to reach unanimity."12 
F Problems with Jury Research Methods 
In an archival analysis, jury verdicts are sampled from court records or court reporting 
services and analysed statistically to describe trends and identify relations between case 
characteristics and jury verdicts. However archival sources omit a great deal of 
potentially relevant information and only document what juries have done, not how or 
why they did it. 73 
Post-trial interviews examine actual jurors on how they reached their decisions. This 
method has serious difficulties with reliability and validity because juror' retrospective 
accounts are vulnerable to memory loss and distortion, and juror interviewing also raises 
ethical and legal concerns.74 
Mock juries are used for most experiments with research participants asked to reach 
judgments regarding a simulated legal trial. The mock jury approach has the added 
advantage of permitting replication across juries within the context of a single trial, and 
there is no legal barrier to observing deliberation.75 
Differences between these experiments and actual trials have led some observers to 
question whether generalisable conclusions about actual jury behaviour can be reached 
12 Johnson v Louisiana 406 US 356 (1972) 389, as cited in Gaunter, above n 49, 68. 
73 MacCoun, above n 59, 224. 
1
• Norbert L. Kerr and Robert M. Bray (eds.) The Psychology of the Courtroom (Academic Press, New York, 
1982) 297. 
75 MacCoun, above n 59, 224. 
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by studying the behaviour of mock juries reacting to written, audiotaped, or videotaped 
trial re-enactments. 76 Experiments comparing mock jurors with subjects who thought they 
were actually trying a case have been inconclusive.77 But overall mock jurors do not 
appear to reach decisions by a fundamentally different process than actual jurors.
78 
VI OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
A Open Deliberations 
1 Arguments for open deliberations 
There are some excellent arguments for removing the secrecy of verdicts which would 
allow research into how juries make their decisions, enabling reform which may assist in 
preventing hung juries. "Sunshine laws" and freedom of information acts sustain the 
operative assumption that knowledge about how our institutions work results in either 
confidence in those institutions or discovery that they do not deserve our confidence and 
need correction. 79 
The (UK) Supreme Court Act 1981, s 67, states that "Our Constitution has been found to 
be best guaranteed by the open administration of justice." However, the secrecy 
surrounding jury deliberations keeps important information, such as the reasons for a 
given verdict, from the .general public as well as the accused and so does not promote 
the open administration of justice. Jeremy Bentham stressed the imperative need for 
public justice, stating that "The grand security of securities is publicity - exposure - the 
completest exposure of the whole system of procedure - whatever is done by anybody, 
being done before the eyes of the universal public."80 
Open deliberations would reveal any problems that occur in jury deliberations and 
decision-making which are shielded by secrecy, where there could be means of 
facilitating jury decision-making, by judges or counsel , that is essential to assist in justice 
occurring. 
1
" Kerr and Bray, above n 77, 287. 
77 MacCoun, above n 59, 224 
78 Hastie, above n 46; Kerr and Bray, above n 77; MacCoun, above n 59, 224. 
79 Abraham S. Goldstein "Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Post-Verdict Interviews" (1993) 2 Uni 
Illinois LR 295, 297. 
80 Jeremy Bentham "Principles of Judicial Procedure " in The Works of Jeremy Bentham Vol 11 (John Bowring 
ed., William Tait Publishers , Edinburgh , 1982). 
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Disclosure would also make juries more accountable, and since the public cannot elect 
or dictate to jurors, it is argued at least the jury ought to know that the public is watching 
its performance. This may also limit any possible prejudices that may affect a verdict, 
and by leaving the deliberations open to public scrutiny there is opportunity to see 
whether the rules of evidence were correctly followed, thus allowing injustices to be 
cured. Disclosure would also enable more certainty and predictability in the law by 
allowing perusal of how and why a jury came to a certain decision. 
81 
Jury disclosures in other jurisdictions, including attempts to solicit or obtain jury 
deliberations, have been converted from being a contempt of court at common law to 
being a statutory offence.
82 Goldstein , in his discussion on post-verdict interviews, feels 
that jury impartiality and the defendant's right to a fair trial are threatened by media 
disclosure.83 
Justice McHugh maintains; "I think that public confidence in the jury system will be 
undermined by more being known about jury deliberations only if the system deserves to 
be undermined. If juries habitually disregard the legal directions or the evidence or are 
incapable of understanding them or if they decide cases by prejudice or extraneous 
matters, then surely it is in the public interest that the system be brought to an end. If 
those who think that the trappings of trial by jury are a cloak for an elaborate farce are 
right, it would be better if verdicts were reached by a less expensive and a less time-
consuming procedure ..... 12 unelected people should not have the power to suspend the 
law."84 
2 Open deliberations for the purposes of research 
Jury deliberations could be allowed to be disclosed or observed on a controlled level for 
the purposes of research. The research that has been performed relating to jury 
deliberations attempts to replicate real trial conditions, but clearly nothing can substitute 
for reality. The problem with this option is that it is possible that disclosure would stifle 
and inhibit free and open discussion amongst jurors during their decision-making, thus 
81 McHugh, above n 3, 65-67. 
82 Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK); Section 576.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code; Rule 
6068 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (USA); Section 69A of the Juries Act 1967 (Victoria, Aust.) . 
83 Goldstein, above n 82, 307 & 310. 
84 McHugh, above n 3, 70. 
affecting the verdict and creating a false situation which would result in corrupt data 
being collected. 
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The jury could be videotaped, but this method could make jurors very self-conscious a
nd 
inhibited. There is always the possibility that juries could be videotaped without their 
knowledge in order to secure a realistic and accurate data source, but this raises ethic
al 
concerns. 05 A less intrusive option would be audiotaping, with juror knowledge, as, in 
my 
opinion, a tape-recorder on a desk is far less intimidating than a video camera, and jur
ors 
may be able to forget its presence. 
Goldstein holds that assumptions that jurors will not perform their historical function of
 
protecting against arbitrary government effectively if deliberations are no longer secret
 
may be incorrect. "It is not at all clear why the fact that their [the jury's] conversations 
in 
the jury room ... may come to be known will make them less courageous. Moreover, 
jurors may become accustomed to the presence of the media. This may make them 
more independent, .. . , rather than less so."
06 
B Research to facilitate the decision-making role of the jury 
Judicial misdirection has been suggested as a possible cause of hung juries or problem
s 
with juries' decision-making.
07 Jury misunderstanding and failure to comprehend the 
judge's directions on the law are also a problem. Juries are expected to make decisio
ns 
on the basis of mainly oral evidence which they must remember, although they are 
permitted to take notes.
00 At present, jurors may take exhibits but not the transcript of the 
trial into the jury room. If the jury has any questions about the evidence, they must ret
urn 
to the court and ask the judge who may read extracts from the transcript to the jury. 
The focus of research to facilitate jury decision-making would be on ways to present 
evidence and structure the trial in order to maximise the jury's understanding and 
retention of evidence. Post-verdict questionnaires would be the most effectively metho
d 
of researching problems that juror's had in making their decisions, especially where 
jurors may indicate what they would have found helpful in assisting them in their task. 
85 See, Enid Campbell above n 51 for discussion on ethical concerns relating to secret ob
servation of jury. 
86 Goldstein, above n 82 , 313. 
87 Gaunter, above n 49, 74. 
88 NZ Law Commission , above n 12, 11 . 
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Factors which may facilitate the jury's decision-making involve the jury being able to as
k 
any questions of the judge or either counsel to clarify their understanding, most likely 
after the trial before enclosure, or at the beginning of each session in court. It might a
lso 
include written opening addresses being providectto the jury at the beginning of the tri
al, 
and the use of flowcharts and summaries to assist in comprehending the law which th
ey 
must apply. 
The Juror's Oath concludes " ... and give your verdict according to the evidence."
89 The 
evidence is the admissible evidence which the judge determines. Therefore the divisio
n 
between the judicial and jury functions is important because if evidence is ruled 
inadmissible then the jury learns nothing of it. 
Evidentiary rules seek to exclude irrelevant or prejudicial evidence which does not ass
ist 
in proving whether or not the accused committed the crime charged. This practice has
 
been criticised by Lord Justice Phillips of the English Court of Appeal who has stated t
hat 
if juries are not trusted to choose commonsense, and are therefore not told all the 
relevant evidence then there is no point in having juries as opposed to judges as triers
 of 
fact.90 
His Lordship considers the English adversarial system pays lip service to the concept 
of 
the jury as arbiter of fact: the jury is not given evidence which may show a propensity o
f 
the accused to committing such a crime, because it is assumed that the jury will place 
too much weight on the evidence. Lord Justice Phillips questions these rules, holding 
that the jury should know all the relevant evidence in order to make an informed 
assessment of the case and he points out that the inquisitorial system does allow past
 
convictions to be put before the jury.
91 
Juries should also have full access to transcripts of the trial during deliberation, since 
they are entrusted with the role of determining the facts. Arguments that their charact
er 
assessment of the witnesses will be lost do not hold, because the words of the witness
es 
is likely to trigger the jurors' memory of their impressions as to whether the witnesses 
was credible or not. 
•• Form 2 in First Schedule, s 22, Jury Rules 1990, Juries Act 1981. 
00 Lord Justice Phillips of the English Court of Appeal , "The Jury", speech given at Victori
a University of 
Wellington Law School , 27 March 1996. 
C Jury Verdicts 
1 Majority verdicts 
The issue of majority verdicts is closely linked with the issue of the le
ngth of jury 
deliberations and hung juries. There have been periodic calls for the
 introduction of 
majority verdicts, but jury research suggests that juries which begin w
ith an 
overwhelming majority in either direction are not likely to hang, and th
at it requires a 
massive minority of four to five jurors at the first vote to develop the li
kelihood of a hung 
jury.92 
23 
Kalven and Zeisel used post-trial juror interviews to reconstruct the in
itial ballots in 225 
criminal jury deliberations. Of the 146 juries with a non-unanimous m
ajority at first ballot, 
only seven reached the verdict advocated by the minority faction. Ka
lven and Zeisel 
suggested that "with very few exceptions the first ballot decides the o
utcome of the 
verdict." 
That said, Hastie's study found that the atmosphere in the majority ru
le juries tended to 
be quite adversarial , while the unanimous rule juries were more delib
erate and laborious 
in their task. It was suggested that "Larger factions in majority rule ju
ries adopt a more 
forceful, bullying persuasive style because their numbers realise that 
it is not necessary 
to respond to all opposition arguments when their goal is to achieve a
 faction size of only 
eight or ten members."
93 
The results of the faction analysis which was part of the Hastie study 
are contrary to all 
the evidence previously advanced in favour of the majority verdict. T
he faction sizes of 
the guilty, not guilty and undecided groups proved to be very influenti
al on the 
deliberating process. For those jurors in large factions, the likelihood
 of moving from that 
faction was very remote. However, in the majority verdicts, it was les
s likely that a juror 
would leave the smaller faction . The most dramatic changes occurre
d in the last 
moments of deliberation, when jurors looked seriously at other option
s and a move 
towards a more lenient verdict often eventuated. 
91 Above n 94. 
92 Napley, D. "The Jury System" [1967] NZLJ 132, 133, as cited in Broo
kbanks, above n 42. 
93 Hastie, above n 46, 260, Gaunter, above n 49, 70. 
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Those advocating majority verdicts have maintained that under a unanimity r
equirement 
the "holdout" juror has too much influence. In R v Walhein the Court of Crim
inal Appeal 
made the observation that" ... it makes for great inconvenience and expense
 if jurors 
cannot agree owing to the unwillingness of one of their number to listen to th
e arguments 
of the rest." 
94 According to one commentator, the-statement in italics identified one of the 
principal arguments in favour of the majority verdict; "It is often supposed tha
t juries 
disagree not because of the objective situation of the case, but rather becau
se once in a 
while an eccentric juror will refuse to play his proper role (the lone juror holdin
g out for 
acquittal)."95 The Hastie study concluded, however, that there were "substan
tial numbers 
of holdout jurors in non-unanimous juries."
96 
One writer warned that majority verdicts will result in the conviction of the inn
ocent unless 
the majority is always right.
97 Judicial statements have been made to the effect that 
majority verdicts could destroy the right of all groups in the community to par
ticipate in 
the judicial process,
98 and that the doubts of even a single juror are evidence that the 
government has failed to carry out its burden of proving guilt beyond a reaso
nable 
doubt.99 Cornish has summed up the dilemma eloquently: "The real strength
 against the 
majority system lies in the possibility of a jury in which only one or two memb
ers can see 
a real obstacle to conviction, but the majority is unable to appreciate the forc
e of their 
objection ."100 
Majority verdicts have often been linked with questions of the burden of proo
f "beyond 
reasonable doubt". Professor Michael Freeman argued that "the concept of a
 majority 
verdict strikes at the root of the fundamental principle of English law that guil
t must be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. If one or two jurymen conscientiously feel 
strongly 
enough to dissent from the majority view that demonstrates to my satisfaction
 that there 
is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused."
101 
94 (1952) 36 Cr App R167. 
95 Napley, D. "The Jury System" [1967] NZLJ 132, 133 as cited in Brookbanks,
 above n 42. 
96 Hastie, above n 46 , 106; Gaunter, above n 49, 67. 
97 Molomby, Letter to the editor, (1989) 13 Crim. LJ 198, as cited in Brookbank
s, above n 42, 189. 
98 Justice Brennan in Johnson v Louisiana , above n 81 , 396. 
99 Justice Marshall in Johnson v Louisiana, above n 81 , 403. 
10° Cornish, above n 13, 259. 
101 As cited in Gerry Maher "The Verdict of the Jury" The Jury under Attack, abo
ve n 3, 40. 
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2 Special verdicts ... General verdicts ... Oo we
 need reform? 
A very significant rule of jury conduct is the right o
f a jury, at its option, to return either a 
general or a special verdict. However, it is doubte
d that this procedure has ever really 
been followed in New Zealand, 
102 and it is not presented by the judge in summing u
p as 
an option for the jury to take in giving their verdict
. 103 In R v Storey it was held that a "jury 
cannot be compelled to answer specific issues."
104 
A general verdict has been criticised in that it may
 conceal error in the jury's 
understanding of the law, in its application of the l
aw, or in its determination of the facts 
of the case.
105 Professor Sunderland is particularly critical of the 
scope which the general 
verdict gives for the jury to misunderstand or misa
pply the law in reaching its verdict, 
saying that" ... twelve men [sic] can easily misund
erstand more law in a minute that the 
judge can explain in a hour."
106 
Those who criticise general verdicts urge the case
 for the special verdict, which leaves 
the final decision as to guilt to the Court. Mark Br
odin , who advocates the "fact" verdict, 
holds that "the impenetrable general verdict ensur
es that meaningful review of the jury's 
decision-making process by appellate courts or th
e public is virtually impossible."
101 
However, in New Zealand appellate courts should
 overturn jury convictions where the 
verdict of the jury "is unreasonable or cannot be s
upported having regard to the 
evidence."10
0 Brodin holds that the use of the general verdict "s
acrifices the strengths of 
the jury to its weaknesses" and that the special ve
rdict "can serve to focus the jurors' 
attention on the critical fact issues in dispute and 
to record precise findings with regard to 
each ... , return[ing] the jury to its original historical
 role, that of reporter of facts."
109 
In the United States, where secrecy surrounding j
ury deliberations is not as strict as New 
Zealand and United Kingdom, a jury gave an acq
uittal for conspiracy to smuggle cocaine 
despite video-taped evidence of the accused with
 a suitcase full of drugs. The accused 
102 Above n 3, Adams, Ch 5.15.03. 
103 Sample summation , above n 4. 
10
• [1931] NZLR 417, 441 per Myers CJ . 
105 McHugh, above n 3, 57. 
10
" ER Sunderland "Verdicts, General and Special" (
1920) 29 Yale LJ 253, 258 as cited in McHugh, ab
ove n 
3 . 
107 Marks. Brodin "Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accoun
tability in the Litigation Process - The Case for the
 Fact 
Verdict" (1990) 59 Uni Cincinnati LR 15, 20. 
10
" Section 385(1 )(a) of the Crimes Act 1961 . 
109 Brodin, above n 110, 21 . 
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appeared to have been framed by an undercover
 government informant, who had been 
caught with drugs himself a year earlier and had s
ince joined the government's anti-drug 
campaign . One juror interviewed on the nature o
f the verdict said "We weren't trying to 
make policy or send messages, but there is a me
ssage here ... It's that our citizens will 
not let our government go too far. We just looked
-a.t the evidence, and I for one saw that 
the government had gone too far in this case."
110 This situation is indicative of the jury 
performing its traditional role as protector of libert
y and safeguard of democracy, as well 
as protecting against police over-eagerness. 
Darbyshire criticises the praise juries have receive
d as defenders against oppressive 
laws and dispensers of fairness and justice due to
 the general verdict. She holds that 
"Baldwin and Mcconville found little evidence of t
he romantic notion of jury equity. 
Unexpected verdicts apparently occurred at rando
m. Personal accounts of ex-jurors 
indicate that they will sometimes acquit or convict
, for a variety of extraneous reasons 
which have nothing to do with replacing the law w
ith their own sense of fairness or 
equity."1
11 
Brodin holds that the special verdict removes the 
major obstacles to proper jury decision-
making, which is the difficulty of correctly compreh
ending, remembering and applying the 
trial judge's substantive instructions on the law.
112 The special verdict seems "tailor-made 
for taking advantage of the impressive fact-finding
 abilities of juries while avoiding the 
distortions that occur between the judge's instruct
ions on the law and the bringing of the 
general verdict."
113 
James Bradley Thayer noted that the matter is mo
re complicated and justified the 
general verdict in these terms:
114 
[While] logic and neatness of legal theory have alw
ays called loud, ... , for special 
verdicts, .. . considerations of policy have called lo
uder for leaving the jury a freer 
hand. The working out of the jury system has nev
er been shaped merely by legal 
or theoretical considerations. That body always r
epresented the people, and 
110 Brill , "Inside the DeLorean Jury Room" (1984) Ame
rican Lawyer 94, 105, as quoted in Caunter, above
 n 
49 , 58 (footnote 15). 
111 Penny Darbyshire "The Lamp that shows that Free
dom Lives - Is it Worth the Candle?" (1991] Crim L
R 
740, 748. 
112 Brodin, above n 110, 46. 
113 Brodin, above n 110, 50. 
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came to stand as the guardian of their liberties; so that whether the c
ourt or the 
jury should decide a point could not be settled on merely legal ground
s; it was a 
question deeply tinged with political considerations. While it would ha
ve always 
been desirable, from a legal point of view, to require from the jury spe
cial verdicts 
and answers to special questions, that of course would have given m
ore power to 
the king and less to the people. 
One proposal for reform urges that the jury give reasons for their gen
eral verdicts, and 
this option is related to special verdicts. When a judge decides a cas
e there will be a 
written opinion finding facts and applying the controlling law. Law ap
plication thus 
becomes law declaration and establishes principles applicable to futu
re cases. 115 
Lack of understanding of the issues could interfere with jury decision-
making, as 
comprehension is affected by variables such as intelligence, familiari
ty with a field of 
knowledge and complexity of a subject. When reasons for a decision
 are given, 
comprehension can be evaluated and tested, without such reasons (a
s for juries) testing 
is difficult. 11
6 
In either scenario, with special verdicts or with general verdicts where
 the jury states their 
reasons, we will be asking jurors to be like judges, and as Goldstein p
oints out; "we do 
not give jurors the robes, the tenure, the professional training, and the
 perquisites to 
make it either fair or appropriate to ask them to perform such a public
 role ."111 
VII CONCLUSION 
MacCoun asserts that " .. . in an evaluation of the jury's merit as a lega
l institution many 
dimensions must be considered - judgmental thoroughness and accu
racy, legal 
competence, impartiality, representativeness, consistency, efficiency,
 and perceived 
legitimacy - only some of which can be assessed by mock jury resear
ch ."118 He goes on 
to state that "the critical questions for public policy are (i) under what 
conditions can jury 
11
• James Bradley Thayer Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 218
-219 as cited in McHugh, above n 3, 
71 -72 (footnote 7) . 
115 Brodin, above n 110, 35. 
11
• Law Reform, above n 3, 61 ff . 
111 Goldstein , above n 82 , 314. 
11
• MacCoun, above n 59, 231 . 
• • • 
performance be enhanced, and (ii) how does the jury perform relative to other legal 
decision-makers?"11 9 
28 
The second question MacCoun raises the issue of whether it is desirable to compare jury 
decision-making to legal decision-making. Bankowski points out that the main trend has 
been to verify the accuracy of the jury by the opinion of legal experts, 120 yet the legitimacy 
of this kind of measure for evaluating jury performance is not established. Bankowski 
argues that the implication of the methodology of using legal experts to show whether 
acquittal rates are too high or too low is that the good juror is one who is a good lawyer, 
namely "one who accepts the prevailing courtroom norms of legal rationality and who is 
willingly incorporated into the social order of the courtroom and the trial."121 
It is evident that questions such as the jury's role in the justice system come into play 
when looking at how to evaluate the jury's performance. Bankowski and many other 
commentators assert that the jury has a role to play in the formulation of new norms for 
society. He cites Professor Freeman, upholding that the jury has acted in defiance of 
established norms; " ... juries may and do infuse "non-legal values" into the trial process. 
They are the conscience of the community; they represent current ethical conventions. 
They are a constraint on legalism, arbitrariness and bureaucracy."122 The involvement of 
jurors as non-legal participants in the justice system is an extremely significant factor in 
supporting not only the maintenance of the general verdict, but the actual institution of 
the jury as well. 
In R v Larkin123 the judge questioned the jury as to their reasons for manslaughter rather 
than murder verdict. The foreman responded with two inconsistent answers; "accident" 
and "provocation". The Court of Criminal Appeal criticised the questioning, stating that 
"No one has ever suggested that a jury is composed of persons who are likely at a 
moment's notice to be able to give a logical explanation of how and why they have 
arrived at a_verdict."124 This statement by the Court aptly replies to the suggestion of 
juries giving special verdicts or reasons for their general verdicts by indicating that it is 
simply impractical. 
11
• MacCoun, above n 59, 231. 
120 Zenon Bankowski "The Jury and Reality" in The Jury Under Attack, above n 3. 
121 Above n 34, 20. 
122 Above n 34, 20. 
123 (1943) KB 174. 
,,. Above n 1 21 . 
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Jury research is a very important area which has been affected because of the limits that 
jury secrecy place on how research can be undertaken. As we have seen, jury research 
methods that are currently available are all problematic. According to Robert MacCoun, 
empirical research on jury functioning is gradually-replacing the reliance on anecdotes 
and speculation in the legal policy domain. "Much is now known about cognitive 
processing at trial and the dynamics of jury deliberation,"
125 
Bray and Kerr disagree with the notion that there exists an optimal research method, 
stating: "The investigator who chooses the field setting to maximise realism must 
sacrifice experimental control and opportunity for observation. The investigator who 
chooses the standard simulation buys control , opportunity to observe, and affordability, 
but at a cost of realism."
126 
The statement by the Court in Larkin1
27 indicates a view that post-verdict interviewing of 
jurors is not a very accurate form of jury research . If research is to be undertaken at all 
actual deliberations by real juries cannot be substituted for. Research based on actual 
juries and jurors is necessary to assist legal policy makers before any reform on the 
scope or conduct of jury trials should be undertaken. 
As Goldstein points out, "We are constrained greatly in changing the jury because its 
several functions are so interconnected and so integrally related to historical doctrines, 
practices and institutions. We proceed at our peril, therefore, both constitutionally and 
functionally, when we challenge one of the jury's core characteristics."
128 
In light of the jury research that has been done on jury decision-making, albeit with 
imperfect test methods, this comment by Lord Devlin seems appropriate to follow until we 
know why and how the jury works or if the jury lives up to the standard that we wish it to 
achieve: "Since no-one really knows how the jury works or indeed can satisfactorily 
explain to a theorist why it works at all , it is wise not to tamper with it until the need for 
alteration is shown to be overwhelming ."
129 
125 MacCoun, above n 59, 231 . 
12
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